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Abstract
I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and
an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with
Tullock’s (1980) classic model where the influence activities are “black-
boxed.” Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent
seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among
rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information
that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking
expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic
that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend
more resources on rent seeking than is in society’s interest, which is con-
sistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature.
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1 Introduction
In a very influential paper, Tullock (1980) introduced a model of rent seeking
in which n economic agents try to win an indivisible prize, for example, the
profits associated with being granted a monopoly of a market.1 They do so
by investing resources into an (abstract, not explicitly modeled) rent-seeking
activity: the more an agent invests, the greater the likelihood that it wins the
prize. In particular, Tullock assumed that each agent’s probability of winning is
given by an exogenous function, parameterized by a constant R. This constant
is a measure of how discriminatory the probability-of-winning function is: in the
limit as R approaches infinity, a rent seeker who spends (perhaps just slightly)
more than his rivals wins with probability one; similarly, in the limit as R
approaches zero, each rent seeker wins with probability 1/n, regardless of the
relative magnitude of the investment levels. Tullock also assumed that the
rent seekers are identical, that they have a common valuation of the prize, and
that they simultaneously choose their investment levels with the objective of
maximizing their expected net gain.
In the Nash equilibrium of Tullock’s model, the sum of all agents’ rent-
seeking expenditures equals a certain fraction of the value of the prize. As the
number of firms goes to infinity, this fraction approaches R.2 Therefore, when
competition among the rent seekers is very stiﬀ, the parameter R tells us what
share of the prize (e.g., the monopoly rent) that is dissipated. An important
part of the rent-seeking literature has been concerned with the question whether,
or to what extent, the rents (of for example a monopoly) will be dissipated by
socially wasteful expenditures to capture them; see for example Nitzan (1994)
and Mueller (2003, Ch. 15).
Tullock’s model, being a reduced form, begs the question exactly why the
rent seekers are influential. Similarly, it is not clear from Tullock’s formulation
why the rent-seeking expenditures are wasted from a social welfare point of view
– it is just assumed that they are. One particular consequence of this assump-
tion is that, in Tullock’s model, competition among rent seekers is always bad,
as a larger number of rent seekers leads to more total rent-seeking expenditures.
Very early, Tullock (1975) suggested himself that one can interpret the rent-
1The idea of rent seeking was first discussed by Tullock (1967), although the term itself was
first introduced by Krueger (1974). A third early and seminal contribution is Posner (1975).
For surveys of the rent-seeking literature, see Nitzan (1994) and Mueller (2003, Ch. 15).
2The existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium requires that R ≤ 1.
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seeking expenditures as costs of information gathering, and the reason why
the rent seekers are influential could be that they (strategically) provide the
decision maker with this policy-relevant information.3 Tullock’s own leading
example was a trial. Another example could be the competitive bidding to host
the Olympic games. Prior to the vote among the members of the International
Olympic Committee, prospective host cities provide the delegates with informa-
tion concerning their ability to host the games. Presumably, this information
does – at least partially – concern issues that are of great importance for the
question which city is most likely to deliver a successful Olympics. For example,
the information could concern the prospective host city’s ability to take care of
local transportation and to deal with security issues during the games.4
Also examples that are closer to the most common ones invoked in the rent-
seeking literature – like a situation in which a regulator chooses which firm
to grant a natural monopoly – may fit the informational story. Prior to the
regulator’s decision, prospective monopolists oﬀer information to the regulator,
which could concern questions such as the eﬃciency of the prospective monop-
olist’s production process, or to what extent the preferences of the consumers
are well served by the features of this particular firm’s good or service.
Although the idea of rent seeking as strategic information gathering and
transmission is plausible, it is not clear whether such a story is properly captured
by Tullock’s reduced form. For if the information that is acquired is relevant for
the decision which rent seeker ought to (from a social welfare point of view) be
granted the prize, then the expenditures are not necessarily wasted. Moreover,
we would not in general expect competition among rent seekers to be bad.
In this paper I present a relatively simple model of competitive rent seeking
with informational foundations. I explicitly model how n prospective monopoly
firms gather (hard, i.e., verifiable) information concerning their eﬃciency and
then strategically choose whether to disclose the information to a regulator. In
light of this information, the regulator chooses which firm to grant the monopoly.
3 In his classic industrial organization textbook, Tirole (1988, Ch. 1, f.n. 26) also argued
that informational asymmetries should be a natural way of providing foundations to the rent-
seeking argument: “The analysis here is very vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model
in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to
building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with
decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful.”
4Of course, the Olympic games is also a good example of a rent-seeking process that is
likely to involve other kinds of influence activites, such as the oﬀering of bribes. We know
for sure that this happened in the process leading up the decision to award Salt Lake City
the 2002 winter Olympics; see, for example, “Timeline: Olympics corruption scandal” at the
BBC website <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/297030.stm> (accessed August 22, 2006).
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This way of thinking about rent seeking may look unreasonably benevolent,
and one might be worried that it biases the results in favor of a view that
rent seeking is after all not that harmful or wasteful. In spite of this possible
bias, however, the analysis highlights a logic that, consistent with the spirit of
the rent-seeking literature, tends to make the firms spend more resources on
information gathering than is in society’s interest.
To see this, note that if society could give the firms instructions as to how
much information to gather, the firms would behave as if the prize that entered
their objective functions was the diﬀerence in social welfare between having
an eﬃcient firm and having an ineﬃcient firm – for it is this diﬀerence that
society can gain by, thanks to the additional information, being able to grant
the monopoly to an eﬃcient firm rather than an ineﬃcient one. In contrast, the
prize that actually enters the firms’ objective functions is the monopoly profits
conditional on being eﬃcient, the reason being that this is the profit they can
earn by successfully gathering information showing that they are eﬃcient. Thus,
even if society’s and a firm’s valuations of that firm’s being granted the monopoly
were identical, both for the case where the firm is eﬃcient and ineﬃcient, the
firm’s perceived prize would be greater as it cares about the profits conditional
on being eﬃcient whereas society would care about this profit/welfare level less
the one where the firm is ineﬃcient.
The analysis also shows that in the limit, as the number of firms approaches
infinity, the total expected amount of rent-seeking expenditures equal a constant
(which can take values between zero and unity) times the perceived prize, which
as explained above equals the monopoly profits conditional on being eﬃcient.
Thus, this constant is a direct analogue to the parameter R in Tullock’s model.
In the model with informational foundations, however, the constant can be
related to fundamentals of the model: it is equal to the inverse of the elasticity
of the cost function associated with information acquisition, evaluated at zero
(for when the number of firms is infinite, each one of them acquires a zero
amount of information).
Finally and most importantly, the microfoundations of the model allow us
to conduct a meaningful welfare analysis. As already mentioned, the equilib-
rium of Tullock’s model has the property that total rent-seeking expenditures
increase as the number of rent seekers increases; moreover, since rent-seeking
expenditures are (by assumption) wasted, welfare moves in the opposite direc-
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tion to total rent-seeking expenditures. In the present model with informational
foundations, I derive a condition that determines whether expected welfare and
total rent-seeking expenditures move in opposite directions or in the same di-
rection as the number of rent seekers increases.5 The parameters entering this
condition are (i) the monopoly profits for an eﬃcient firm, (ii) the diﬀerence
in social welfare between having an eﬃcient monopoly firm and having an in-
eﬃcient monopoly firm, (iii) the inverse of the elasticity of the cost function
associated with information acquisition, and (iv) the prior probability that a
firm is eﬃcient. For many configurations of these parameters, expected welfare
increases as the number of rent seekers becomes larger – competition among
rent seekers is welfare enhancing.6
The present paper is by no means the first one to develop a model of influ-
ence activities with informational foundations. Formal game-theoretic models in
which lobbying is conceived as an exercise in strategic information transmission
can be found in, for example, Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), Potters and van
Winden (1992), Austen-Smith (1995), Lagerlöf (1997), Grossman and Helpman
(2001), Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002), and Frisell and Lagerlöf (2006). Un-
like the present paper and Tullock (1980), however, these contributions allow
only for either one or two lobbyists. Therefore they are not able to study the
eﬀects of a gradual increase in the number of lobbyists/rent seekers on for ex-
ample welfare, nor can they say anything about the degree of rent dissipation
in the limit as the number of rent seekers goes to infinity.
Lohmann (1993a, 1994) develops a model in which a large number of people
may take costly political action (e.g., take part in a demonstration), either prior
to a vote (the 1994 paper) or prior to a political leader’s decision (the 1993a
paper). By taking political action, the individual may be able to signal her pri-
vate information to the other voters or to the political leader. Lohmann (1993b)
carries out a welfare analysis of this model and shows that political action can
be both under- and oversupplied in equilibrium, which also the present paper
does. Related signaling models of lobbying are studied also in Lohmann (1995a,
1995b). However, in contrast to the present paper, Lohmann’s papers do not
study the eﬀects of a gradual increase in the number of political activists, nor
5Although it remains to be proven analytically, total rent-seeking expenditures appear to
be increasing in the number of firms for all parameter values of the model, just as in the
Tullock model (see the examples in Section 6).
6Becker (1983) argues that competition between interest groups is welfare enhancing. Just
like in Tullock (1980), however, the influence activities in Becker’s model are “black-boxed.”
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do they relate to Tullock’s model by, for example, calculating the degree of rent
dissipation in the limit as the number of political activists goes to infinity.
There are two reasons why the model in the present paper can deal with an
arbitrary number of rent seekers while still keeping the analysis tractable: (i)
the information transmission is modeled as a disclosure game (i.e., rent seekers
are allowed to withhold information but not to lie)7 and (ii) the expected payoﬀ
of a typical rent seeker can be rewritten in a succinct form thanks to some
algebraic manipulations (see equation (2) in Section 4).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides a formal presentation of Tullock’s model. In Section 3, the model with
informational foundations is introduced. In Section 4, this model is solved and
the first results are stated. Section 5 considers social welfare, and Section 6 il-
lustrates the results using some numerical examples. Section 7 briefly concludes
and discusses some possible extensions and variations of the model. Most of the
proofs are relegated to some appendices.
2 The Tullock Model
Tullock (1980) considers a model in which n identical economic agents, or rent
seekers, try to win an indivisible prize, their valuation of which equals v (> 0).
Rent seeker i’s probability of winning is given by
Pi (x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
(
xRi?n
j=1 x
R
j
if
Pn
j=1 x
R
j 6= 0
1/n otherwise,
where xi (≥ 0) is this rent seeker’s investment. The parameter R (> 0) is a
measure of how discriminatory the rent-seeking contest is: The larger is this
parameter, the greater is the likelihood that a rent seeker who spends strictly
more than his rivals will win. In particular, in the limit as R approaches infin-
ity, a rent seeker who spends (perhaps just slightly) more than his rivals wins
with probability one. Similarly, in the limit as R approaches zero, each rent
seeker wins with probability 1/n, regardless of the relative magnitude of the
xi’s (as long as they are all strictly positive). For the special case R = 1, a
rent seeker’s probability of winning equals his own investment divided by the
sum of all rent seekers’ investments. Tullock also assumed that the rent seekers
7Other contrubutions modeling lobbying as a disclosure game include Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), Laﬀont and Tirole (1991; 1993, Ch. 11), Lagerlöf (1997), Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999), Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002), and Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005).
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simultaneously choose their xi’s with the objective of maximizing their expected
net gain, Pi (x1, x2, . . . , xn) v − xi, while taking the others’ behavior as given.
It is a standard exercise to show that for R ≤ 1 and for any finite n, there
exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Tullock’s model. In this
equilibrium, which is symmetric, each rent seeker’s investment is given by
x∗ =
(n− 1)Rv
n2
.
The dissipation rate, the amount of resources used in total by the rent seekers
as a fraction of the value of the prize, therefore equals nx∗/v = R (n− 1) /n.
Hence, the dissipation rate is increasing in the number of rent seekers, and as the
number of them goes to infinity the dissipation tends to R. As a consequence,
under the assumption that the rent-seeking expenditures have no social value,
more competition among rent seekers (i.e., a larger n) is always bad.
3 A Model with Informational Foundations
There are n (≥ 2) ex ante identical firms and one regulator. The regulator
can grant a monopoly on a market to one of the firms. Each firm is either
“eﬃcient” or “ineﬃcient.” If the firm that is granted the monopoly is eﬃcient,
then social welfare (we can think of this as total surplus or consumer surplus)
is given by WH ; otherwise, if the firm is ineﬃcient, social welfare is given by
WL, with WH > WL. The regulator cares about social welfare, and ideally he
would like to grant the monopoly to a firm that is eﬃcient. Initially, however,
the regulator faces uncertainty about whether a particular firm is eﬃcient or
ineﬃcient. The prior probability that a firm is eﬃcient is given by μ, where
μ ∈ (0, 1). Each firm knows itself whether it is eﬃcient or ineﬃcient,8 but it
faces the same uncertainty about the other firms as does the regulator. The
realizations of these random events are independent.
An eﬃcient firm that is granted the monopoly earns the monopoly profits
πH . An ineﬃcient firm that is granted the monopoly earns the monopoly profits
πL, with πH > πL > 0. A firm that is not granted the monopoly earns some
“outside profits,” which are normalized to zero. Hence, any firm, regardless of
whether it is eﬃcient or ineﬃcient, wants to be granted the monopoly.
8An alternative assumption would be that a firm faces the same uncertainty about its own
eﬃciency as do the other firms and the regulator. That assumption would yield very similar
results, however.
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Although each firm at the outset knows whether it is eﬃcient or ineﬃcient,
the information it has is assumed to be soft (i.e., non-verifiable). This means
that an eﬃcient firm will not be able to simply tell the regulator about the fact
that it is eﬃcient – such a claim would not be credible since an ineﬃcient firm
has an incentive to make the same claim. The firms can, however, in addition to
their soft information, gather information that is hard (i.e., verifiable). Doing
this is costly, but if a firm finds hard information showing that it is eﬃcient,
it can show this to the regulator who will then be more likely to grant the
monopoly to that particular firm.
Formally, conditional on knowing whether it is eﬃcient or ineﬃcient, each
firm i first chooses how much to spend on information gathering,9 yij ∈ <+
(where the subindex j = H,L indicates whether the firm is eﬃcient or ineﬃcient,
respectively). This level of expenditures determines a probability ϕ (yij) ∈ [0, 1],
where ϕ (·) is a twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly concave function
satisfying ϕ (0) = 0 and limyij→0 ϕ
0 (yij) = ∞. With this probability, the
firm finds hard information as to whether it is eﬃcient or ineﬃcient; with the
complementary probability 1−ϕ (yij), the firm does not find anything. Since the
information is hard, the firm can, if it so likes, show the evidence to the regulator,
in which case the regulator learns (for sure) whether the firm is eﬃcient or
ineﬃcient. The firms choose yij simultaneously, and neither this choice nor the
fact whether they find hard information or not can be observed by the other
firms or by the regulator.
The regulator is a Bayesian updater. Given that some of the firms have
shown him hard information that they are eﬃcient and the others have not, the
regulator grants the monopoly to a firm whose likelihood of being eﬃcient, as
perceived by the regulator, is at least as high as the likelihood for any other
firm. In the equilibrium of the model, this must be a firm that has shown the
regulator hard information, as long as there is such a firm.10 It is assumed that
the regulator chooses which firm of those who have submitted hard information
to grant the monopoly by using a fair lottery; hence, if k firms have submitted
9Given that firms have soft information from the outset and that they gather only hard
information, one could have used the term “evidence production” rather than “information
gathering.” I will stick to the latter term, though.
10For these firms are eﬃcient with probability one, and the others are eﬃcient with a strictly
lower probability. To see that this must be the case, remember that μ < 1. Moreover, the
fact that a firm has not presented hard information speaks against the possibility that it is
eﬃcient, since in equilibrium the ineﬃcient firms have a lower (in fact zero) incentive to gather
information.
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hard information, each of them is granted the monopoly with probability 1/k.
Similarly, in case no firm has submitted hard information, the monopoly is
allocated using a fair lottery among all n firms, so that each is granted the
monopoly with probability 1/n.
4 Analysis
Given that the firms in the model are ex ante identical, it is natural to consider
equilibria in which all firms’ behavior are the same. I will thus confine attention
to symmetric equilibria of the model.
As noted above, a firm that knows that it is ineﬃcient will not expend
resources trying to find hard evidence about this; thus, yiL = 0 for all i. In
order to characterize the equilibrium choice of yiH , we need to find an expression
for firm i’s expected payoﬀ given that it itself chooses the investment level yiH
and that it believes its eﬃcient rivals all choose, say, the investment level by. If
firm i as well as exactly k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1} of its rivals are both eﬃcient
and successful in their investigations, then firm i is granted the monopoly with
probability 1/ (1 + k). Moreover, the probability that exactly k of the n − 1
rivals are eﬃcient and successful, given that they all chose by, is given byµ
n− 1
k
¶
[μϕ (by)]k [1− μϕ (by)]n−1−k .
This means that firm i’s expected profit at the stage where it is about to choose
yiH can be written as
ViH (yiH , by) = ϕ (yiH) n−1X
k=0
µ
n− 1
k
¶
[μϕ (by)]k [1− μϕ (by)]n−1−k πH
k + 1
+ [1− ϕ (yiH)] [1− μϕ (by)]n−1 πHn − yiH . (1)
For large n, this expression consists of a very long series of terms. We can
write it much more succinctly, however, thanks to the following relationship
(see Appendix A for the derivation):
n−1X
k=0
µ
n− 1
k
¶
[μϕ (by)]k [1− μϕ (by)]n−1−k
k + 1
=
1− [1− μϕ (by)]n
μϕ (by)n . (2)
The expression in (2) is the expected likelihood that firm i will be granted the
monopoly, at the stage when it knows that it itself is eﬃcient and has found
hard information about this. Using (2) in (1) and then rearranging, we have
ViH (yiH , by) = P (yiH , by)πH − yiH , (3)
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where
P (yiH , by) ≡
h
1− [1− μϕ (by)]n−1iϕ (yiH)
μϕ (by)n + [1− μϕ (by)]n−1n . (4)
The function P (·) can be thought of as a probability-of-winning function,
analogous to the one in Tullock’s model. In contrast to Tullock’s model, how-
ever, here we have P (0, by) > 0: a firm can win the monopoly even if it does
not expend any resources at all. The reason is that if all other firms either
are ineﬃcient or are eﬃcient but fail to find hard information, a firm wins the
monopoly with probability 1/n.11
There are also other, strategically more important, diﬀerences between this
model and Tullock’s. In the present model, the cross-derivative of the objective
function ViH (yiH , by) is zero for n = 2, which means that each firm has a strictly
dominant strategy; and it is negative for n ≥ 3 (for the proof of this, see
Appendix B), which means that the firms’ choice variables are (loosely speaking)
strategic substitutes.12 In contrast, in Tullock’s model the rent seekers’ choice
variables are (globally) neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes,
as the sign of the cross derivative depends on the relative magnitude of the own
and the rivals’ choice.
Moreover, the term in (3) that corresponds to v, the value of winning the
prize in Tullock’s model, is not (as one might have expected without giving it
much thought) equal to Eπ = (1− μ)πL + μπH , but to πH . This is not just
because the objective function in (3) is calculated conditional on knowing that
the firm is eﬃcient; we would get the same result if we instead had assumed that
the firms do not know whether they are eﬃcient or ineﬃcient when choosing
their rent-seeking investment (as suggested in footnote 8). The reason why πH ,
and not Eπ, is what matters is that the investment choice is made with an
eye towards the firm’s profits conditional on being eﬃcient – the point with
expending yiH is that it may help the firm prove that it is eﬃcient. (The same
logic explains why yiL = 0.) Similarly, in an alternative model in which the
firms did not know initially whether they were eﬃcient or ineﬃcient, the choice
of investment level would be a function of πH , not of Eπ.
11From (4) we see that P (0, ?y) is equal to the product of 1/n and [1− μϕ (?y)]n−1, the latter
being the probability that all other n− 1 firms either are ineﬃcient or are eﬃcient but fail to
find hard information.
12This is only “loosely speaking” because we have assumed that the value of all other firms’
choice variables, ?y, are identical (before and after the infinitesimal change).
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Firm i’s problem is to maximize (3) with respect to yiH , taking the other
firms’ behavior (i.e., by) as given. The first-order condition to this problem is
∂ViH (yiH , by)
∂yiH
=
h
1− [1− μϕ (by)]n−1iϕ0 (yiH)
μϕ (by)n πH − 1 = 0. (5)
The assumption that limyiH→0 ϕ
0 (yiH) = ∞ guarantees that yiH = 0 is not
optimal. Also, let us assume that the parameters are such that the yiH that
solves (5) satisfies ϕ (yiH) < 1 (for example, that πH is not too large).
In a symmetric equilibrium we must have yiH = by = y∗. Plugging this into
(5), we obtain the following result (the uniqueness claim is proven in Appendix
C).
Proposition 1. For any n ≥ 2, there exists a pure strategy symmetric equilib-
rium. Within the class of symmetric equilibria, this equilibrium is unique,
and it is characterized by
1− [1− μϕ (y∗)]n−1
μϕ (y∗)n
πH =
1
ϕ0 (y∗)
. (6)
We also have the following comparative statics results (proven in Appendix
D).
Proposition 2. The equilibrium investment level y∗ is strictly increasing in
πH , and (for n ≥ 3) it is strictly decreasing in μ.
The second result is the only one that is not obvious. The reason why the
equilibrium investment level is decreasing in μ is that (for n ≥ 3) the players’
choice variables are strategic substitutes, and a larger μ means that it is more
likely that firm i’s typical rival is of a type who chooses a positive investment
level.
Among other things, we are interested in what happens to aggregate expen-
ditures as n goes to infinity. To investigate this, we first need the following
results (proven in Appendix E).
Lemma 1. As n→∞, y∗ → 0.
Lemma 2. As n→∞, [1− μϕ (y∗)]n−1 → 0.
Lemma 2 tells us that the probability that (all other) n− 1 firms lack hard
evidence showing that that they are eﬃcient goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
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Define expected total expenditures as TE (y∗) ≡ nμy∗. By (6),h
1− [1− μϕ (y∗)]n−1
i
πHη (y∗) = nμy∗ = TE (y∗) , (7)
where
η (y) ≡ ϕ
0 (y) y
ϕ (y)
is the elasticity associated with the function ϕ (·).13 (Note that by concavity of
ϕ (·), η (y) < 1 for all y.) By taking the limit of (7), using Lemmas 1 and 2 and
the notation η (0) ≡ limy→0 η (y), we obtain the following.
Proposition 3. In the limit as the number of firms goes to infinity, expected
total expenditures equal the monopoly profits for an eﬃcient firm times
the elasticity η (y) evaluated at zero:
lim
n→∞
TE (y∗) = η (0)πH .
Apparently, the parameter R in Tullock’s model corresponds to η (0) in the
present model, in the sense that this parameter tells us what fraction of the rent
seekers’ prize will be dissipated by expenditures as the number of rent seekers
goes to infinity.
5 Welfare
Suppose all n firms invest the same amount, y, if they are eﬃcient and zero
otherwise. Given y, let EW (y) be defined as the ex ante expected social welfare,
net of expected total expenditures:
EW (y) = [1− (1− μϕ (y))n]WH+(1− μϕ (y))n [bμWH + (1− bμ)WL]−TE (y) ,
(8)
where bμ ≡ μ [1− ϕ (y)]
1− μϕ (y) (9)
is the probability that a firm that has not provided hard information showing
that it is eﬃcient nevertheless is eﬃcient (this can be derived by using Bayes’
rule). Note that, quite intuitively, bμ < μ for any ϕ (y) > 0.
13Note that the inverse of ϕ (·), call it C (·), gives us the cost a rent seeker must incur in
order to benefit from a particular probability of finding hard information. The elasticity η (y)
can therefore be interpreted as the inverse of the elasticity associated with the function C (·),
or the inverse of the cost elasticity.
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The first term in (8) is given by the product of (i)WH (social welfare if having
an eﬃcient firm) and (ii) the probability that at least one of the n firms indeed
is eﬃcient and finds hard information showing this. The second term in (8) is
given by the product of (i) the probability that none of the n firms is eﬃcient
and finds hard information showing this and (ii) expected social welfare given
that the firm being granted the monopoly is eﬃcient with probability bμ. The
third term in (8) is the expected total rent-seeking expenditures. Substituting
(9) into (8) and simplifying we have
EW (y) =WH − (1− μ) (1− μϕ (y))n−1∆W − TE (y) , (10)
where ∆W ≡WH −WL.
We may ask two questions about EW (y). First, if a planner could choose
the y that maximizes EW (y), call it yw, how would this relate to y∗? That
is, in the equilibrium of the model, does an individual firm spend too much
or too little resources on rent seeking, relative to the socially desirable level?
Second, if we evaluate EW (y) at y = y∗, will this expression be increasing or
decreasing in the number of firms, n? That is, is more competition among the
rent seekers good or bad for welfare in this model where the influence activities
have informational foundations?
To answer the first question, let us diﬀerentiate EW (y) and set the resulting
expression equal to zero, thus obtaining the following first-order condition, which
implicitly defines yw:
(1− μ) (n− 1) (1− μϕ (yw))n−2 ϕ0 (yw)∆W − n = 0. (11)
The assumption that limy→0 ϕ0 (y) =∞ guarantees that yw = 0 is not optimal.
Let us also assume that the parameters are such that the yw that solves (11)
satisfies ϕ (yw) < 1 (for example, that ∆W is not too large).
In general, yw may be either smaller or larger than y∗. However, comparing
(11) and the first-order condition that defines y∗, (6), we can make the following
three observations: (i) The “prize” that matters for society is ∆W : the diﬀer-
ence in social welfare between having an eﬃcient firm and having an ineﬃcient
firm. In contrast, as we noted above, a firm that chooses yiH cares about πH ,
its profits conditional on being eﬃcient.14 As a consequence, even if society’s
14As discussed previously, the reason why the firm cares about πH rather than Eπ is not
just that it knows that it is eﬃcient; it would make its choice contingent on being eﬃcient also
if it made the choice at an ex ante stage. The reason for this is that the point with expending
yiH is that it may help the firm prove that it is eﬃcient.
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and an individual firm’s incentives were aligned in the sense that WH = πH
and WL = πL, the firm would still invest too much if πL is suﬃciently close to
πH , regardless of the values of the other parameters. (ii) For n = 2, the two
first-order conditions can be written as
(1− μ)∆W
2
=
1
ϕ0 (yw)
(12)
and
πH
2
=
1
ϕ0 (y∗)
. (13)
This means that, for this case,
yw R y∗ as (1− μ)∆W R πH . (14)
Consistent with observation (i), we see that πL does not enter the condition
in (14), only ∆W and πH do. In addition, (12) and (13) tell us that whereas
the firm’s choice does not depend on μ, society’s optimal choice of rent seeking
investment is decreasing in μ. In particular, for any values of ∆W and πH (e.g.,
for ∆W being much larger than πH) the firm will spend too much resources on
rent seeking if the probability μ is suﬃciently close to one. Intuitively, if μ is
close to unity, society knows that a firm that it picks just by random is likely
to be eﬃcient; thus, it is in society’s interest that only a very small amount of
resources is spent on rent seeking. In contrast, the firm does not take this into
account; it expends the same amount on rent seeking for all values of μ. (iii)
Again making use of the first-order conditions that define y∗ and yw, we see
that (now for any arbitrary n) in the limit as μ approaches 1, yw approaches
0 whereas y∗ approaches some strictly positive number (the intuition being the
same as the one discussed under observation (ii)).
In order to answer our second question – whether EW (y∗) is increasing or
decreasing in n – we can evaluate (10) at y = y∗ and then rewrite it using (7),
thus obtaining
EW (y∗) = μWH + (1− μ)WL + TE (y∗)
∙
(1− μ)∆W
πHη (y∗)
− 1
¸
.
It follows that, if the elasticity η (y) is constant (i.e., η (y) = η), then
∂EW (y∗)
∂n
=
∙
(1− μ)∆W
πHη
− 1
¸
∂TE (y∗)
∂n
. (15)
We therefore have the following result.
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Proposition 4. If the elasticity η (y) is constant and if TE (y∗) is increasing
in n, then
∂EW (y∗)
∂n
R 0 as (1− μ)∆W R ηπH .
The important implication of Proposition 4 is that, even if TE (y∗) is in-
creasing in n,15 EW (y∗) is not necessarily decreasing in n. This result stands
in sharp contrast to Tullock’s model (although there, the fact that a larger num-
ber of rent seekers is bad for welfare follows immediately from the assumption
that more expenditures is a bad thing). In particular, provided TE (y∗) is in-
creasing in n, EW (y∗) is increasing in n as well if (1− μ)∆W > ηπH . This
inequality will be satisfied if: (i) ∆W is large, so that society cares a lot about
whether an eﬃcient or an ineﬃcient firm is granted the monopoly; (ii) μ is small,
so that the prior probability that a firm is eﬃcient firm is low (which makes it
more desirable to have many firms to choose among); (iii) πH is small, so that an
eﬃcient firm does not have a lot to gain from being granted the monopoly; and
(iv) η is small, so that the amount of expected total rent-seeking expenditures
with many firms is small.
When the inequality is reversed, so that (1− μ)∆W < ηπH , EW (y∗) is
decreasing in n whenever TE (y∗) is increasing in n, just as is assumed in Tul-
lock’s model. For the special case (1− μ)∆W = ηπH , EW (y∗) is constant with
respect to n; in particular, EW (y∗) takes the same value evaluated at n = 1 as
it does in the limit as n goes to infinity:16
EW (y∗) |n=1= μWH + (1− μ)WL =WH − ηπH = lim
n→∞
EW (y∗) .
6 Numerical Examples
In this section I will study some numerical examples that illustrate the results
in the two previous sections. Rewriting the first-order condition that defines y∗,
(6), we have
y∗ =
h
1− [1− μϕ (y∗)]n−1
i η (y∗)πH
μn
. (16)
Similarly, rewriting (11) yields
yw = (1− μϕ (yw))n−2 (1− μ) (n− 1) η (y
w)ϕ (yw)∆W
n
. (17)
15Although it remains to be proven analytically, TE (y∗) appears to be increasing in n for
all parameter values of the model, at least as long as the elasticity η (y) is constant (see the
examples in the next section).
16The model does not formally allow for n = 1. However, it is straightforward to see that a
firm that does not have any rivals will not spend any resources on rent seeking: y∗ |n=1= 0.
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Using (16) and (17) – and given functional forms for ϕ (·) and values of the
parameters – we can easily (using, for example, a spreadsheet program like
Excel) calculate values of y∗ and yw by first guessing a value, substitute this
into the right-hand side of (16) and (17), respectively, thereby obtaining a new
guess, which again can be substituted into the right-hand side of the relevant
equation. After suﬃciently many iterations, this procedure will give us a good
approximation of the unique solution to the equation.
As an illustration, let us assume that
ϕ (y) =
√
y
16
,
which implies that η (y) is constant and equal to 0.5. Moreover, let μ = 0.5,
WH = 500, and WL = 100 (so that ∆W = 400). Given these functional forms
and parameter values, y∗ and yw have, for various values of n, been calculated
using six alternative values of πH :17
πH ∈ {100, 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000} .
In addition, using the calculated values of y∗ and yw, the associated levels
of expected total rent-seeking expenditures and of expected welfare have been
calculated. The six diﬀerent values of πH have been chosen to make sure that:
for πH ∈ {100, 200}, EW (y∗) is increasing in n whenever TE (y∗) is increasing
in n; for πH ∈ {600, 800, 1000}, EW (y∗) is decreasing in n whenever TE (y∗)
is increasing in n; and for πH = 400, EW (y∗) is constant with respect to n.
The results are reported in Table 1, and graphs of EW (y∗) as a function of
n for the six diﬀerent values of πH are shown in Figure 1. The table shows that
for all six cases TE (y∗) is increasing in n. We also see, however, that y∗ is, in
all our examples, not monotone in n.
In summary, Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the insight from Proposition
4 that in this model of rent seeking with informational foundations, expected
welfare is not necessarily increasing in the number of rent seekers just because
the total rent-seeking expenditures are. Competition among rent seekers may
be good. In particular, we obtained this result for relatively low values of πH ,
as in those cases the rent seekers’ benefit from rent seeking is small relative to
society’s.
17One must of course check that, given the chosen parameters, the assumptions that ϕ (y∗) <
1 and ϕ (yw) < 1 are satsfied.
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7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model of rent seeking with informational foundations
and with an arbitrary number of rent seeking firms. In general in this model,
the firms’ incentives to spend resources on rent seeking will obviously diﬀer
from society’s, as the firms care about their own expected profits and not about
social welfare. What the analysis revealed and which is less obvious, however,
is that the firms will choose their rent seeking investments with an eye toward
their profits conditional on being an eﬃcient (as opposed to ineﬃcient) firm,
the reason being that the point with doing rent seeking is that this may provide
evidence that the firm is eﬃcient. Society, on the other hand, would like the
choice of rent seeking expenditures to be made with an eye toward the diﬀerence
in social welfare between having an eﬃcient firm and having an ineﬃcient firm
– for it is this diﬀerence that society can gain by, thanks to the additional
information, being able to grant the monopoly to an eﬃcient firm rather than
an ineﬃcient one. To the extent that this diﬀerence is smaller than the firm’s
profits conditional on being eﬃcient (which seems to be a natural possibility,
as the latter is a profit level and not a diﬀerence), the rent seekers will tend to
– in the spirit of the rent-seeking literature – have a too strong incentive to
invest in rent seeking from a social welfare point of view.
The analysis also showed that in the limit as the number of firms approach
infinity, the total expected amount of rent-seeking expenditures equal a constant
η (0) times the perceived prize, where this constant is equal to the inverse of the
elasticity of the cost function associated with information acquisition (evaluated
at zero). Thus, the constant η (0) is a direct analogue to the parameter R in
Tullock’s model. Most importantly, the microfoundations of the model in the
present paper allowed us to conduct a meaningful welfare analysis. In particular,
I derived a condition that determines whether expected welfare and total rent-
seeking expenditures move in opposite directions or in the same direction when
the number of rent seekers increases. For many configurations of the parameters,
expected welfare increases as the number of rent seekers becomes larger, which
means that competition among rent seekers may be welfare-enhancing.
Let me conclude by briefly discussing a couple of possible extensions and
variations of the model. First, as already mentioned in footnote 8, instead of
assuming that each firm at the outset has access to full (but only soft) informa-
tion about its own eﬃciency, one could say that a firm faces the same uncertainty
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about its own eﬃciency as do the other firms and the regulator. One can show,
however, that – because of the simple, linear structure of the model – this as-
sumption would in many regards yield very similar results.18 Second, I assumed
that the firms can, at a cost, obtain hard evidence that confirms their true type.
Alternatively, one could have assumed that the ineﬃcient firms can in addition
fabricate (false) evidence showing that they are eﬃcient, and that doing this is
costly for the firms. In such a model, expenditures on fabrication of evidence
cannot have any social value. Therefore, we should expect that the possibility
of fabrication would add to the social costs of rent seeking. Because of the same
reason we should also expect the set of circumstances under which expected
welfare increases as total rent-seeking expenditures increase to be smaller.19
Appendix A: Proof of Eq. (2)
Since
¡n−1
k
¢
=
¡ n
k+1
¢
k+1
n , we can write
n−1X
k=0
µ
n− 1
k
¶
(μϕ (by))k (1− μϕ (by))n−1−k
k + 1
=
1
n
n−1X
k=0
µ
n
k + 1
¶
(μϕ (by))k (1− μϕ (by))n−1−k
=
1
μϕ (by)n
n−1X
k=0
µ
n
k + 1
¶
(μϕ (by))k+1 (1− μϕ (by))n−(k+1) .
Defining m ≡ k + 1, we can rewrite the last line as
1
μϕ (by)n
nX
m=1
µ
n
m
¶
(μϕ (by))m (1− μϕ (by))n−m
=
1
μϕ (by)n
nX
m=0
µ
n
m
¶
(μϕ (by))m (1− μϕ (by))n−m − 1
μϕ (by)n
µ
n
0
¶
(1− μϕ (by))n
=
1− (1− μϕ (by))n
μϕ (by)n ,
where the last equality makes use of
Pn
m=0
¡n
m
¢
(μϕ (by))m (1− μϕ (by))n−m = 1
and
¡n
0
¢
= 1. ¤
18The fact that the analysis under this alternative assumption would be very similar is
quite significant. The present model could be criticized for allowing the regulator to use only
a very limited set of instruments: if the regulator were able to commit to a somewhat richer
mechanism, he would easily be able to implement the first best. However, under the alternative
assumption that each firm faces the same uncertainty about its own eﬃciency as do the other
firms and the regulator, implementing the first best would be much less straightforward.
19Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005, Section 6.4 and Appendix A) discuss the consequences of
this kind of assumption in the context of a model that is similar to the one in the present
paper (but with a single rent seeker).
17
Appendix B: Proof of the claim about strategic
substitutes for n ≥ 3
We need to show that ∂2ViH (yiH , by) /∂yiH∂by < 0 for n ≥ 3. Diﬀerentiating (3)
yields
∂2ViH (yiH , by)
∂yiH∂by
=
μϕ0 (by) (n− 1) [1− μϕ (by)]n−2 ϕ (by)− ϕ0 (by) h1− [1− μϕ (by)]n−1i
[ϕ (by)]2 × ϕ
0 (yiH)
μn
= ϕ0 (by) h[1− μϕ (by)]n−2 [(n− 2)μϕ (by) + 1]− 1i× ϕ0 (yiH)
μn [ϕ (by)]2 .
We thus need to show that
[1− μϕ (by)]n−2 [(n− 2)μϕ (by) + 1] < 1
for all n ≥ 3. This will be done by mathematical induction. One can easily show
that the inequality holds for n = 3. Suppose it holds for some n = m (≥ 3).
The left-hand side of the inequality evaluated at n = m+ 1 can be written as
[1− μϕ (by)]m−1 [(m− 1)μϕ (by) + 1]
= [1− μϕ (by)] [1− μϕ (by)]m−2 [(m− 2)μϕ (by) + 1 + μϕ (by)]
= [1− μϕ (by)] [1− μϕ (by)]m−2 [(m− 2)μϕ (by) + 1] + [1− μϕ (by)]m−1 μϕ (by)
< [1− μϕ (by)] + [1− μϕ (by)]m−1 μϕ (by)
< [1− μϕ (by)] + [1− μϕ (by)]μϕ (by) = 1− [μϕ (by)]2 < 1,
where the first inequality follows from the induction assumption and the second
and third by the fact that μϕ (by) < 1. ¤
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
The existence and characterization of the symmetric equilibrium is proven in the
text. To see that the equilibrium is unique, first notice that the right-hand side of
(6) is strictly increasing in y∗, due to the concavity of ϕ (·). Second, diﬀerentiat-
ing the left-hand side of (6) with respect to y∗ yields− [1− g (μ, ϕ (y∗) , n)]πHϕ0 (y∗) / [ϕ (y∗)]2 μn,
where
g (μ, ϕ (y∗) , n) = (1− μϕ (y∗))n−2 [1 + (n− 2)μϕ (y∗)] .
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It thus suﬃces to show that g (μ, ϕ (y∗) , n) ≤ 1 for all y∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Diﬀerentiating
g with respect to y∗ yields
∂g (μ, ϕ (y∗) , n)
∂y∗
= −μ2ϕ0 (y∗)ϕ (y∗) (n− 1) (n− 2) (1− μϕ (y∗))n−3 ≤ 0 for all ϕ (y∗) ∈ [0, 1] .
Hence, for all ϕ (y∗) ∈ [0, 1], g (μ, ϕ (y∗) , n) ≤ g (μ, ϕ (y∗) , n) |y∗=0= 1. ¤
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2
First consider the claim about μ. Diﬀerentiating both sides of (6) w.r.t. μ yields
∂ (LHS)
∂μ
+
∂ (LHS)
∂y∗
∂y∗
∂μ
= − ϕ
00 (y∗)
[ϕ0 (y∗)]2
∂y∗
∂μ
,
where LHS is short for the left-hand side of (6). From Appendix C we have
that ∂ (LHS) /∂y∗ is strictly negative. Moreover, the same must be true for
∂ (LHS) /∂μ (since ϕ (y∗) and μ have symmetric roles in the left-hand side of
(6), and ϕ0 (y∗) > 0). In addition, ϕ00 (y∗) is negative. It follows that ∂y∗/∂μ <
0.
The claim about πH is very straightforward given the above arguments and
the proof is therefore omitted. ¤
Appendix E: Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose per contra that limn→∞ y∗ = y
0
> 0, so that
ϕ
³
y
0
´
∈ (0, 1) and ϕ0
³
y
0
´
> 0. Then the limit of the right-hand side of (6)
as n goes to infinity equals 1/ϕ0
³
y
0
´
, which by assumption is strictly positive.
The limit of the left-hand side, however, equals zero. ¤
Lemma A1. As n→∞, ϕ (y∗)n→∞.
Proof. First note that, by Lemma 1, the right-hand side of (6) goes to zero
as n→∞. If Lemma A1 does not hold, then either (i) ϕ (y∗) goes to zero at the
same speed as 1/n or (ii) ϕ (y∗) goes to zero faster than 1/n. In either case, the
numerator of the left-hand side of (6) must go to zero as n→∞, for otherwise
the equality would not hold in the limit. In case (i), however, we can write
lim
n→∞
(1− μϕ (y∗))n−1 = lim
n→∞
³
1− μ
n
´n−1
,
which can be shown to equal e−μ (> 0). In case (ii), both the numerator and
the denominator of the left-hand side of (6) go to zero, so we can use l’Hopital’s
19
rule (once) and then simplify:
lim
n→∞
1− (1− μϕ (y∗))n−1
μϕ (y∗)n
= lim
n→∞
− (1− μϕ (y∗))n−1
h
log (1− μϕ (y∗))− μ(n−1)1−μϕ(y∗)ϕ
0 (y∗) ∂y
∗
∂n
i
μ
³
ϕ (y∗) + nϕ0 (y∗) ∂y
∗
∂n
´
=
limn→∞ (1− μϕ (y∗))n−1
h
limn→∞
³
μ(n−1)
1−μϕ(y∗)
´
limn→∞
³
ϕ0 (y∗) ∂y
∗
∂n
´
− limn→∞ [log (1− μϕ (y∗))]
i
μ
³
limn→∞ ϕ (y∗) + limn→∞ n limn→∞ ϕ0 (y∗) ∂y
∗
∂n
´ .
As the numerator of the left-hand side of (6) goes to zero, limn→∞ (1− μϕ (y∗))n−1 =
1. Moreover, by Lemma 1, limn→∞ ϕ (y∗) = limn→∞ [log (1− μϕ (y∗))] = 0.
The previous expression therefore simplifies to
limn→∞
³
μ(n−1)
1−μϕ(y∗)
´
limn→∞ ϕ0 (y∗) ∂y
∗
∂n
μ limn→∞ n limn→∞ ϕ0 (y∗) ∂y
∗
∂n
=
limn→∞
³
n−1
1−μϕ(y∗)
´
limn→∞ n
= 1.
This is strictly positive, whereas the limit of the right-hand side of (6) is zero.
¤
We can now prove Lemma 2. By Lemma A1, ϕ (y∗) goes to zero slower than
1/n. Hence, for n large enough, ϕ (y∗) > 1/n, which implies ϕ (y∗) ≥ 1/nβ for
some β ∈ (0, 1). This means that, for such large n’s,
(1− μϕ (y∗))n−1 ≤
³
1− μ
nβ
´n−1
.
One can show that as n → ∞, the right-hand side of this inequality goes to
zero; therefore, so does the left-hand side. ¤
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Table 1: Numerical examples. 
 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
y* 0.00 2.44 4.07 4.78 5.06 5.11 5.06 4.95 4.82 4.67 4.52 4.37 4.22 4.08 3.95 3.82 3.70 3.59 3.48 3.37 
TE(y*) 0.0 2.4 6.1 9.6 12.6 15.3 17.7 19.8 21.7 23.4 24.9 26.2 27.5 28.6 29.6 30.6 31.5 32.3 33.0 33.7 
EW(y*) 
π
H
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
300.0 307.3 318.3 328.7 337.9 346.0 353.1 359.4 365.0 370.1 374.6 378.7 382.4 385.8 388.9 391.7 394.4 396.8 399.1 401.2 
y* 0.00 9.77 15.30 16.90 16.94 16.38 15.62 14.80 14.01 13.26 12.56 11.92 11.33 10.79 10.30 9.84 9.42 9.03 8.68 8.34 
TE(y*) 0.0 9.8 23.0 33.8 42.3 49.1 54.7 59.2 63.0 66.3 69.1 71.5 73.7 75.5 77.2 78.7 80.1 81.3 82.4 83.4 
EW(y*) 
π
H
 
=
 
2
0
0
 
300.0 309.8 323.0 334.3 343.5 351.3 357.9 363.6 368.6 373.1 377.1 380.8 384.1 387.1 390.0 392.6 395.0 397.3 399.4 401.4 
y* 0.00 39.06 54.37 54.45 50.80 46.57 42.60 39.08 36.00 33.32 30.98 28.93 27.12 25.51 24.07 22.78 21.62 20.57 19.61 18.74 
TE(y*) 0.0 39.1 81.5 108.9 127.0 139.7 149.1 156.3 162.0 166.6 170.4 173.6 176.3 178.6 180.5 182.3 183.8 185.1 186.3 187.4 
EW(y*) 
π
H
 
=
 
4
0
0
 
300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 
y* 0.00 87.89 109.36 101.87 90.83 80.76 72.27 65.21 59.30 54.31 50.06 46.41 43.23 40.45 38.00 35.82 33.87 32.12 30.54 29.10 
TE(y*) 0.0 87.9 164.0 203.7 227.1 242.3 253.0 260.8 266.8 271.6 275.3 278.4 281.0 283.2 285.0 286.6 287.9 289.1 290.1 291.0 
EW(y*) 
π
H
 
=
 
6
0
0
 
300.0 270.7 245.3 232.1 224.3 219.2 215.7 213.1 211.1 209.5 208.2 207.2 206.3 205.6 205.0 204.5 204.0 203.6 203.3 203.0 
y* 0.00 156.25 174.85 154.16 133.29 116.24 102.64 91.70 82.77 75.36 69.14 63.84 59.27 55.31 51.83 48.75 46.02 43.57 41.36 39.37 
TE(y*) 0.0 156.2 262.3 308.3 333.2 348.7 359.3 366.8 372.5 376.8 380.3 383.0 385.3 387.2 388.7 390.0 391.2 392.1 393.0 393.7 
EW(y*) 
π
H
=
 
8
0
0
 
300.0 221.9 168.9 145.8 133.4 125.6 120.4 116.6 113.8 111.6 109.9 108.5 107.4 106.4 105.6 105.0 104.4 103.9 103.5 103.2 
y* 0.00 244.14 247.03 208.75 176.63 152.04 133.09 118.16 106.15 96.30 88.08 81.14 75.19 70.04 65.54 61.58 58.07 54.92 52.10 49.55 
TE(y*) 0.0 244.1 370.5 417.5 441.6 456.1 465.8 472.6 477.7 481.5 484.5 486.8 488.7 490.3 491.6 492.7 493.6 494.3 495.0 495.5 
EW(y*) 
π
H
 
=
 
1
0
0
0
 
300.0 153.5 77.7 49.5 35.1 26.3 20.5 16.4 13.4 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 
yw 0.00 9.77 13.59 13.49 12.42 11.21 10.09 9.11 8.26 7.53 6.90 6.36 5.88 5.46 5.09 4.76 4.46 4.20 3.96 3.74 
TE(yw) 0.0 9.8 20.4 27.0 31.0 33.6 35.3 36.4 37.2 37.7 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.1 37.9 37.8 37.6 37.4 
EW(yw) 300.0 309.8 323.0 334.3 343.5 351.3 357.9 363.6 368.6 373.1 377.1 380.8 384.1 387.1 390.0 392.6 395.0 397.3 399.4 401.4 
 
